

f. Threat manifestation:


ECOA 1 (most likely)


- It is not accessed that we will meet any resistance during the house and area search
- The suspects will attempt to flee into the surrounding urban area
- A large number of children and adults will gather at the cordon or CP – some will try to interfere, especially when we block main traffic lines within the city.

ECOA 2 (worst case)

- As inner cordons are placed some of the suspects might open fire from their houses
- If possible the suspects will try to create as much delay as possible on our search, allowing them to draw attention and reinforcements to the targets.
- Locals and anti MNF elements from within AZ might try to interfere with the redrawal of troops from target areas.

g. Picture gallery:





3.1. Target 2.

a. Target type:

- Insurgent grouping, training facility
- Weapons caches
- 3 x Dimitroff 30 guns
- 107mm rockets, mortar systems and AKs.
- Launchers for 107mm rockets
- Igniter systems to IEDs and rockets (motorcycle and car batteries, keyless car entry systems)
- Documents incriminating the organisation
- Explosives
- Detonators
- Anti MNF/anti IIG propaganda

b. Available target information:

- Allegedly a training facility for the organisation of "Khalid Ibn Al-Walid"
- Owned by Mr. Hammoud il Wabdaan
- Syrians, Saudis and Iraqis from Fallujah and Ramadi allegedly stays there for insurgency training
- Allegedly 3 x Dimitroff 30 guns are located there (observed personally by SO1/S2/602)
- During Najaf offensive, 7-8 vehicles were observed bringing weapons and people.

c. Suspects:

See. Pkt. 1.5.1

d. Other residents:

The farms are reportedly inhabited by families which might bring the number of pax within the complex to as much as 50 pax. Including many women and children. Most likely there will be dogs and other domestic animals within the farms.

e. Target buildings:

- One store brick and clay buildings.
- Numerous windows
- Numerous small adjacent buildings
- Outer walls with small gateway entrances

f. Threat manifestation:

ECOA 1 (most likely)

- It is not assessed that we will meet any resistance during the house and area search

ECOA 2 (worst case)

- As inner cordons are placed some of the suspects might open fire from their houses
- If possible the suspects will try to create as much delay as possible on our search, allowing them to draw attention and reinforcements to the targets.
- Locals and anti MNF elements from within AZ might try to interfere with the redrawing of troops from target areas.

g. Picture gallery:



3.2. Target 3.

a. Target type:

- Al Qaida operatives
- Documents
- Explosives
- Detonators
- Anti MNF/anti IIG propaganda

b. Available target information:

- Hotel: "Burg Babyl"
- Reported to house FF
- Reportedly 30-50 pax armed with SA (AL Qaida linked)
- SO1/S3/601 links hotel with FF related to Al Qaeda and Zarqawi grouping based in Az Zubayr.
- Two weeks ago a former Lt. Col. entered the hotel. He is from Fallujah and served with the army engineers during Saddam. This was reported to S2/602 by an IPS officer who served in the intelligence service during the former regime
- 10 NOV 04 SO1/S2/602 reported an increase of people, allegedly from Fallujah, checking into the hotel

c. Suspects:

See. Pkt. 1.5.1

d. Other residents:

- Probably other guests and employees in hotel

e. Target buildings:

- See picture, no inside information available.

f. Threat manifestation:

ECOA 1 (most likely)


- It is not accessed that we will meet any resistance during the house and area search
- The suspects will attempt to flee into the surrounding urban area
- A large number of children and adults will gather at the cordon or CP – some will try to interfere, especially when we block main traffic lines within the city.

ECOA 2 (worst case)

- As inner cordons are placed some of the suspects might open fire from the hotel
- If possible the suspects will try to create as much delay as possible on our search, allowing them to draw attention and reinforcements to the targets.

5. Locals and anti MNF elements from within AZ might try to interfere with the redrawing of troops from target areas.

g. Picture gallery:



3.2. Target 4a.

a. Target type:

- Insurgent grouping
- Hidden basements
- Weapons caches; 107mm rockets, mortar systems and AKs.
- Launchers for 107mm rockets
- Igniter systems to IEDs and rockets (motorcycle and car batteries, keyless car entry systems)
- Documents incriminating the organisation
- Explosives
- Detonators
- Anti MNF/anti IIG propaganda

b. Available target information:

- Reportedly HQ of Al-Taqyas (sufi religious organisation)
- Tribe: Darweesh
- Izzat Al-Duuri (senior advisor to Pres. Saddam) reportedly supported the place during former regime.
- Allegedly there are hidden cellars concealing weapons and explosives

c. Suspects:

See. Pkt. 1.5.1

d. Other residents:

- Families might bring the number of pax within the building to as much as 15 pax. Including women and children.
- Most likely there will be dogs within the complex.

e. Target buildings:

- See picture, no inside information available.

f. Threat manifestation:


ECOA 1 (most likely)

- It is not accessed that we will meet any resistance during the house and area search
- The suspects will attempt to flee into the surrounding urban area
- A large number of children and adults will gather at the cordon or CP – some will try to interfere, especially when we block main traffic lines within the city.

ECOA 2 (worst case)

- As inner cordons are placed some of the suspects might open fire from the house
- If possible the suspects will try to create as much delay as possible on our search, allowing them to draw attention and reinforcements to the targets.
- Locals and anti MNF elements from within AZ might try to interfere with the redrawal of troops from target areas.

g. Picture gallery:



3.2. Target 4b.

a. Target type:

- Insurgent grouping
- Hidden basements
- Weapons caches; 107mm rockets, mortar systems and AKs.
- Launchers for 107mm rockets
- Igniter systems to IEDs and rockets (motorcycle and car batteries, keyless car entry systems)
- Documents incriminating the organisation
- Explosives
- Detonators
- Anti MNF/anti IIG propaganda

b. Available target information:

- Reportedly HQ of Al-Taqqas (sufi religious organisation)
- Tribe: Darweesh
- Izzat Al-Duuri (senior advisor to Pres. Saddam) reportedly supported the place during former regime.
- Allegedly there are hidden cellars concealing weapons and explosives

c. Suspects:

See. Pkt. 1.5.1

d. Other residents:

- Families might bring the number of pax within the building to as much as 15 pax. Including women and children.
- Most likely there will be dogs within the complex.

e. Target buildings:

- No picture, and no inside information available.

f. Threat manifestation:


ECOA 1 (most likely)

- It is not accessed that we will meet any resistance during the house and area search
- The suspects will attempt to flee into the surrounding urban area
- A large number of children and adults will gather at the cordon or CP – some will try to interfere, especially when we block main traffic lines within the city.

ECOA 2 (worst case)

- As inner cordons are placed some of the suspects might open fire from the house
- If possible the suspects will try to create as much delay as possible on our search, allowing them to draw attention and reinforcements to the targets.
- Locals and anti MNF elements from within AZ might try to interfere with the redrawal of troops from target areas.

g. Picture gallery:



NO FURTHER PHOTOS AVAILBLE